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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
for so long a period. Furthermore, it is fair to infer that actual proof
of the original ouster has become lost through the lapse of time.
It is to be noted that the new Section 41-a applies to past, present
and future occupancies but the legislature in its endeavor to remove
the source of grievance has not lost sight of the rights of the co-
tenants out of possession. Their rights are adequately guarded by
the safety clause as found in sub-section (2) which limits the retro-
active application of the new statute so that a tenant in common who
has been out of possession for more than fifteen years has a reason-
able time to assert his rights and thereby prevent the tenant in pos-
session from obtaining a title by adverse possession.
The statutory amendment is a recognition by the legislature of
the need for freer and less complicated rules of law relating to trans-
fers of real property and to that end it is submitted that the new
amendment will facilitate the clearing of titles.
JOSEPH C. BRUEN.
UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAw.-Every year over a
hundred thousand men desert their wives and families. There are at
least a million deserted dependents in the United States, three-
quarters of whom are children under sixteen.' The direct cost of
supporting these dependents is over fifty million dollars. Indirectly
many more millions are spent fighting the resulting crime, juvenile
delinquency, illness and allied ills. 2 Add to this what price you will
for the human misery which always accompanies the disintegration
of a home and some idea of the import of this social cancer will be
realized.
Fortunately there are some restrictions on the impunity with
which husbands may abandon their families. Applicable within Neiv
York State there are laws forming a tight network of protection for
wives and children. Chiefly administered by the Children's Court
and the Domestic Relations Court of New York City, their jurisdic-
tion unfortunately ends at the state and city line.3 When once the
delinquent husband had fled the state, they were powerless. To be
sure there was one weapon available to the authorities but so cum-
I According to figures obtained from the Abandonment Bureau of the Kings
County District Attorney's office, in 1948 in Brooklyn alone 1,558 women and
children were abandoned.
Number of children under 16 .................................... 977
Number of pregnant wives ..................................... 22
Number of non-pregnant wives ................................ 559
Not all cases were reported.
2 Woodbury, Runaway Husbands, LADIEs HOME JOURNAL, September 1949,
p. 34.
3 N. Y. CHILDREN'S CT. ACT §§ 30-34; N. Y. Do-m. REL. CT. AcT §§ 91-159.
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bersome and ineffective did it prove that it was rarely used. Under
Sections 5Q and 480 of the Penal Code, abandonment in certain cases
was made a felony for which the errant husband could be criminally
extradited,4 tried, and if convicted, sentenced to jail.' The expense
of this method was prohibitive -for it necessitated sending police offi-
qers to other states. Even the prohibitive cost might not have been
a deterrent, if at this point any concrete relief, other than punitive,
could have been evolved. Unfortunately it could not, and the futility
of criminal over civil laws was amply demonstrated, for now in addi-
tion to having as public charges the wife and children, we also had
the husband. Understandably the courts were reluctant to sentence
husbands to jail and frequently they were released upon their prom-
ise to support their dependents; a promise easily made and soon
forgotten.
Amazingly enough this deplorable state of affairs was allowed tQ
exist unchecked until 1948, at which time the New York State Leg-
islature took the first faltering step in a new approach to remedy the
evil. By Chapter 790 of the Laws of 1948 which added Section 30-b
of the Children's Court Act and Section 91-a of the Domestic Rela-
tions Court Act, the evil was summarily ended by conferring addi-
tional jurisdiction and powers upon all Children's Courts and the.
Family Court of the City of Nev York in, support proceedings against
persons residing in other states and territories having substantially
similar or reciprocal laws.0
4 N. Y, PENAL CODE § 50 makes abandonment of a pregnant wife a felony.
N. Y. PENAL CODE § 480 makes abandonment of children under 'sixteen a
felony.
5N. Y. CRIM. CODE § 832.
6 N. Y. CHiLDREN'S CT. AcT § 30-b; N. Y. Dom. REL. CT. AcT § 91-a.
These two sections identical in tenor permitted the Children's Court within
its territorial jurisdiction and the Family Court within the city, to *take ttst-
mony in all proceedings to compel support of a wife, child and/or poor relative
residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in any case where the
person legally liable therefor resides in a state or territory of the United States
having substantially similar or reciprocal laws. In such cases the court may
forward transcripts of the testimony taken, all other pertinent reports, and its
recommendation, to the appropriately empowered official in the other state or
territory having authorify to institute supporf proceedings. This 'official rep-
resents the dependent in court and havijig due regard for the circumstances of
the various parties, the court may order the respondent to support his -depen-
dents. The respondent was given the right to cross-exaniine by deposition or
otherwise, any person whose testimony or report has been forwarded in such
proceeding.
Conversely the sections also provided that upon the petition of a wife,
child and/or other poor relative, the corporation counsel or other official having
power and authority to initiate and prosecute support proceedings' action on
behalf of such wife, child .and/or poor relative residing in any state or ter-
ritory of the United States having substantially similar or reciprocal laws, in
any case where the person legally liable therefor resides within the territorialjurisdiction of the court, the court could order the respondent to support his
dependents. The personal appearance of such petitioner was unnecessary but
transcripts of testimony and copies of reports made in connection with the
1949 ]
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From a substantive viewpoint these two amendments probably
could have accomplished their purpose. However, they were subject
to two major criticisms. As amendments or additions to the Chil-
dren's Court Act and the Domestic Relations Court Act, they, of
course, had to be viewed in terms of the entire Act. No problem
was presented when the petitioner was a resident of New York and
brought her action there, for probably the reports required by Sec-
tions 113, 114, 115 and 116 of the Domestic Relations Court Act
could be forwarded to the other state under the portion of the amend-
ments which authorized the forwarding of exemplified transcripts and
reports. A different problem however was presented when the peti-
tioner was not a resident for then there existed no patent authoriza-
tion for the New York court to accept the reports of a foreign court
in lieu of the interview of petitioner required by Section 113, the
visit to petitioner's home by a probation officer required by Section
114, the investigation after the interview of all previous records re-
quired by Section 115, the conference with other agencies required
by Section 116 and finally the effort at conciliation required by Sec-
tion 118.7
While possibly these procedural difficulties could have been rem-
edied there was one other more serious objection to the amendments.
By adding two sections to its existing law, New York had created
a very clumsy model for the other states to follow. The previous
paragraph pointed out a few difficulties which New York immedi-
ately encountered in construing the amendments. Multiply this by
48 and this advancement in social legislation would have been still-
born. What obviously was needed was a new, separate and uniform
approach which could cut through the existing legal hodge-podge
with the keenness of a surgeon's scalpel. In order then to obviate
the possibility of interstate and intrastate conflict, and to provide a
model act for others to copy, these two amendments were repealed
in 1949, and in their stead was enacted the independent and com-
prehensive uniform act which is the law today.8
petition were to be forwarded to the corporation counsel or official by the
court of the state or territory wherein petitioner resided. The respondent had
the right to cross-examine by deposition or otherwise any person whose testi-
mony or report had been forwarded in such proceeding.
The court was further empowered in these proceedings only: to order
interrogatories or depositions to be taken within and without the state; to com-
pel support of children irrespective of a decree of legal separation of the
parents or the dissolution of the marriage of the parents by a decree of divorce
or annulment; to make any order necessary to carry out and enforce the pro-
visions of this section as if the court had jurisdiction over the persons of the
wife, child and/or poor relative seeking support and of the person legally liable
therefor; to order costs and disbursements in the discretion of the court taxed
against the respondent.
7 N. Y. Dom. RPEi CT. Acr §§ 113, 114, 115, 116, 118.
8 Laws of N. Y. 1949, c, 807.
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This Act, since it purports to be complete in itself, contains both
substantive and procedural provisions. Section 2111 states its short
title and purpose.9 Section 2112 consists of definitions of terms used
in the Act many of which are important, for they are defined to
secure a broad coverage, and in some cases differ from previous defi-
nitions. For example the definition of a "child" in the Domestic
Relations Court Act was one who actually or apparently was under
sixteen; 10 a "child" under the new Act is one who actually or ap-
parently is under seventeen."
For the purpose of this law a husband is charged with liability
for the support of his wife and children under seventeen and any
other dependent whether they reside in the same or any other state
having similar or reciprocal laws. In like manner where the husband
is dead, missing or incapable of supporting his dependents, the lia-
bility for support falls upon the wife. Where the child is seventeen
or over and is likely to become a public charge, the parents are also
severally liable. Divorce or separation will not relieve the respon-
dents of these responsibilities.12
Under this Act the court is given jurisdiction regardless of the
state of last residence of either party and whether or not the respon-
dent has ever been a resident of the initiating state or the dependent
a resident of the responding state. The responding state is given the
power to order the respondent to pay any reasonable and proper sum
as justice requires. Providing the respondent is given a fair oppor-
tunity to answer, the courts of both states are given power to take
testimony by deposition or written interrogatories, limiting the tes-
timony where proper.'3
Section 2115 permits this Act to be employed in any of the fol-
lowing cases: (a) Where the petitioner and respondent are resi-
dents of or domiciled or found in the same state. (b) Where peti-
tioner resides in one state and the respondent is a resident of or is
domiciled or found in another state having similar or reciprocal laws.
(c) Where the respondent is not and never was a resident of or domi-
ciled in the initiating state and the petitioner resides or is domiciled
in such state and the respondent is believed to be a resident of or
domiciled in another state having substantially similar or reciprocal
laws. (d) Where the respondent was or is a resident of or domi-
ciled in the initiating state and has departed or departs from such
state leaving therein a dependent in need of and entitled to support
under this Act and is believed to be a resident of or domiciled in an-
other state having substantially similar or reciprocal laws. 14
9N. Y. UTNcoNSOL LAws § 2111.
20 N. Y. Dom. RFm CT. Acr §2.
"IN. Y. UNcONsoL LAWS § 2112.
22 Id. § 2113.
Is Id. § 2114.
4 Id. § 2115.
1949 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Under Section 2116 a procedure is delineated which includes the
method of payment. Punishment for violations of. the Act are set at
whatever the punishment is for a contempt of such .cqurt or probation
order in any proceeding cognizable by such court. 15
Section 2117 describes the duties of the petitioner's represetta-
tive; 2118 provides that this Act shall .b.e an additional remedy in no
way impairing existing remedies, civil or. criminal.16  Section 2119
provides for a uniform interpretation, and finally Section 2120 orders
that any invalidity adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction
shall apply only to that part of the Act involved leaving unaffected
all other portions. 17
Doubtlessly when the uniform Act is submitted to the acid test
of judicial construction minor flaws will be discovered which will
make revision necessary. Already one such flaw has been discovered,
and it is a source of serious annoyance in the New York area at least.
The definition of state in the Act read, ". . . shall mean and include
any state and territory of the United States and the District of
Columbia." Overlooked in this definition was the technical distinc-
tions between territories of the United States and possessions. The
Kings County .istrict Attorney's office is already concerned over
this problem for in New York's heterogeneous population, there are
many former residents of United States possessions.
However, on the whole the Act is carefully drawn and except
for one fact would undoubtedly solve the problem. The heart of the
Act is its reciprocity; and it is immediately apparent that while there
remains only one state yet to enact the law the remedy cannot be
completely effective, for to that one state will flock all the errant
husbands.18 Indicated, therefore, is the strong and steady exertion
of public opinion upon the various state legislators to hasten the
passage of this salutatory law which various private and semi-public
organizations, taking the initiative, have introduced in the respective
states.
HAROLD V. McCoY.
AN ACT TO AMEND THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT IN RELATION TO
JOINDER OF PARTIES AND C4USES OF AcTIONo.-The New York Leg-
islature, in March, 1949, enacted a law I amending the Civil Practice
Act with respect to permissive joinder of parties, which was for..
is Id. § 2116.
16Id. §§2117, 2118.171d. §§ 2119, 2120.
18 So far the Act has been enacted in Indiana, Iowa, Oklahoma, Maine,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Illinois. Delaware and New York. In addition
the Virgin Islands have adopted the law.
'Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 147.
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